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NOTE
CARPENTER’S LEGACY: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE
ELECTRONIC PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
Sarah A. Mezera*
One of the most significant challenges confronting courts and legal scholars in
the twenty-first century is the application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to
new technology. The circuit split over the application of the private search
doctrine to electronic devices exemplifies how courts struggle to apply old
doctrines to new circumstances. Some courts take the position that the old
doctrine should apply consistently in the new context. Other courts have
changed the scope of the old doctrine in order to account for the change in
circumstances. The Supreme Court took the latter position in Carpenter v.
United States and held that the third-party doctrine does not apply to cellsite location information records. The Court’s willingness to limit the scope of
an established doctrine to preserve fundamental privacy interests suggests
that Carpenter is just the beginning of a dramatic shift in Fourth Amendment law. This Note argues that the circuit split over the private search doctrine should be resolved by creating a narrow electronic private search
doctrine based on the logic of Carpenter.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent and rapid advances in technology challenge traditional legal doctrines. The Fourth Amendment is one particular area of law facing such
challenges. 1 The animating principle behind the Fourth Amendment has not
changed in light of the digital age—individual privacy interests are weighed
against important government interests. 2 But the fundamental and pervasive
changes that accompany technological advances potentially alter the way
that balance is struck. As technology continues to evolve, courts and legal
scholars face important questions of how to preserve, amend, or reject existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.
One of the most notable recent changes to Fourth Amendment doctrine
occurred in Carpenter v. United States. 3 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court
protected individual privacy interests by declining to extend the third-party
doctrine to cell-site location information (CSLI). 4 The third-party doctrine
has been a part of Fourth Amendment law since 1976, 5 and it has been extended numerous times by the Court. 6 Yet the Court in Carpenter found that
CSLI is a qualitatively different category of information to which the thirdparty doctrine does not apply. 7 This limitation of the third-party doctrine
raises an important question: Should the capability of technology to amass
incredible amounts of information similarly limit the scope of other doctrines under the Fourth Amendment?
The private search doctrine is closely related to the third-party doctrine
at issue in Carpenter 8 and is a microcosm of the challenges the Fourth
Amendment faces in the twenty-first century. Under the Fourth Amendment, government agents are generally required to get a warrant based on
probable cause to conduct a search of persons or property. 9 There are, how-

1. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004).
2. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 407 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many cell
phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly
personal, that no person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form. This calls for a
new balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests.”).
3. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
5. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”).
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (applying the third-party doctrine to a pen register).
7. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19.
8. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 130 (1984) (White, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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ever, several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the private
search doctrine. 10 The private search doctrine can be traced to Walter v.
United States, in which the Supreme Court hinted that police may be allowed
to reexamine materials searched by a private person without first obtaining a
warrant. 11 Later, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Court officially announced
that the private search doctrine was a formal exception to the warrant requirement. 12
Under the private search doctrine, the police may reconstruct a private
search without obtaining a warrant in advance. 13 The Court reasoned that
because the owner’s expectation of privacy was already frustrated by a private search, the subsequent government search did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. 14 The government search must remain within the same scope
as the original private search unless the officer is “virtually certain” they will
find similar evidence beyond the scope of the private search. 15 In Jacobsen,
the scope of the government search was limited to the physical container
searched by private parties. 16 But with new technology, the permissible scope
of an electronic government search under the private search doctrine has become a contested question among federal circuits. 17
Federal courts disagreed on the doctrine’s scope even before cases applied the private search doctrine to electronic devices. 18 The dispute over the
scope of the doctrine intensified when searches became electronic in na-

10. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (exigent circumstances); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (consent); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 444
(1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
11. 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
12. 466 U.S. at 119.
13. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119. The Court in Jacobsen distinguished a private search from
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment only proscribes government action; therefore, a search conducted by a private individual not acting as a government
agent does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 113.
14. Id. at 120. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
15. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (“[T]here was a virtual certainty that nothing else of
significance was in the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its contents
would not tell him anything more than he already had been told.”).
16. See id. (“Respondents could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package,
since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had just examined the
package . . . .”).
17. See Matthew A. Lupo, Privacy in the Digital Age: Preserving the Fourth Amendment
by Resolving the Circuit Split over the Private-Search Doctrine, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 414, 415
(2017).
18. Compare United States v. Rouse, 148 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the government searchers exceeded the scope of a private search because they had no previous
information about some of the items they searched), with United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d
607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the government searchers did not exceed the scope of a
private search “simply because they took more time and were more thorough than” the private
searchers).
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ture. 19 Computers, smartphones, and various other electronic devices are
like digital containers that can store an immense amount of information. 20
The difference in nature between an electronic device, such as a computer,
and a physical container, such as a cardboard shipping box, has renewed the
debate over how courts should strike the balance between individual privacy
interests and important government interests under the private search doctrine. If the Jacobsen container-based approach is to be preserved, the fundamental question is: What is the electronic equivalent of a physical
container?
This Note argues that the scope of the private search doctrine as applied
to electronics should be limited to only the exact data viewed by the private
searcher. Part I discusses the current circuit split over how the private search
doctrine applies to electronic devices and contrasts how different circuits
have defined an electronic “container.” Part II analyzes how Carpenter’s limitation on the third-party doctrine will affect the private search doctrine’s
scope. Part III argues that the Court should resolve the circuit split by adopting a narrow rule that defines an electronic “container” as only the exact data
viewed by the private searcher and limits the scope of the government search
to just the data exposed on a device’s screen.
I.

THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING AN ELECTRONIC “CONTAINER”

When the Supreme Court established the private search doctrine in
1984, it did not consider how the doctrine would apply to electronic devices. 21 This lack of foresight left lower courts to decide how to apply the doctrine to electronic devices as technology developed rapidly. The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have adopted a rule that allows the government to search
the entire electronic device after a private search. 22 The Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted a rule that allows the government to search only the
data that a private searcher viewed. 23 This Part will discuss the two approaches to defining an electronic “container”—a bright-line rule and a
more flexible standard.
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Runyan outlines one side
of the circuit split. 24 The Fifth Circuit was the first to apply the private search

19. See Alexandra Gioseffi, Comment, Lichtenberger, Sparks, and Wicks: The Future of
the Private Search Doctrine, 66 EMORY L.J. 395, 399 (2017).
20. See Benjamin Holley, Note, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private
Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 682 (2010).
21. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109.
22. Brianna M. Espeland, Implications of the Private Search Doctrine in a Digital Age:
Advocating for Limitations on Warrantless Searches Through Adoption of the Virtual File Approach, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 777, 781 (2017).
23. Id. at 782.
24. 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001). The electronic devices at issue in Runyan were CDs
and floppy disks. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 453.

May 2019]

Carpenter’s Legacy

1491

doctrine to electronic devices, doing so in 2001. 25 The Fifth Circuit took the
view that an electronic device (in this case, a CD or floppy disk) is a “container,” similar to the physical shipping box at issue in Jacobsen. 26 The court
treated each CD or floppy disk as a separate “container.” 27 Once a private
searcher accessed the disk, the government could search the entire device. 28
The court reasoned that defining an entire device as a “container” created a
clear and administrable rule. 29 Additionally, this rule would “preserve[] the
competing objectives underlying the Fourth Amendment’s protections
against warrantless police searches.” 30 The court’s approach protects a defendant’s expectation of privacy in containers unopened by a private searcher 31 and “discourages police from going on ‘fishing expeditions’ by opening
closed containers.” 32 The Runyan rule is clear and administrable, but it is
loosely tailored and exposes excess data to government searches. 33
The Runyan rule has been cited as persuasive precedent in other federal
courts. The rule created in Runyan was explicitly adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in Rann v. Atchison. 34 In Rann, the court held that the police would
not exceed the scope of a private search if they viewed the entire contents of
a zip drive and a camera memory card. 35 The Runyan rule has also been
adopted by district courts outside the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. For example, the Northern District of California cited the Runyan rule as persuasive

25. See id. at 461 (“Due to the lack of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court and
the lack of consensus among our sister circuits regarding the precise nature of the evaluation
required, we must tread carefully in our disposition of this issue.”); see also Espeland, supra
note 22, at 796–815 (outlining the circuit decisions applying the private search doctrine to electronic devices).
26. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–64 (discussing the container-based approach in Jacobsen and applying that approach to CDs and floppy disks).
27. See id. at 464 (finding that any evidence police obtained from each disk not searched
by the private searchers was potentially subject to suppression).
28. See id. at 463 (“[T]he police exceed the scope of a prior private search when they
examine a closed container that was not opened by the private searchers . . . .”).
29. See id. at 464–65 (“Any evidence that police obtain from a closed container that was
unopened by prior private searchers will be suppressed unless they can demonstrate to a reviewing court that an exception to the exclusionary rule is warranted . . . .”).
30. Id. at 463.
31. Id. at 463–64.
32. Id. at 464.
33. See Lupo, supra note 17, at 427 (“[I]n United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit held
that a private searcher who opened only a few files on a computer had effectively searched the
entire hard drive. As a consequence, it was irrelevant that police opened storage files different
than those the original private searcher had opened . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
34. 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We find the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Runyan to
be persuasive, and we adopt it.”).
35. Rann, 689 F.3d at 838 (“[E]ven if the police more thoroughly searched the digital
media devices than S.R. and her mother did and viewed images that S.R. or her mother had not
viewed, per the holding in Runyan, the police search did not exceed or expand the scope of the
initial private searches.”).
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precedent in United States v. Guindi. 36 The court in Guindi, however, refrained from fully adopting the Runyan rule and emphasized that the private
searcher in that case had viewed almost every file on the CDs before the government search. 37 Thus, the Runyan rule embodies one side of the circuit
split over how the private search doctrine applies to electronic devices.
The Sixth Circuit articulates the other side in United States v. Lichtenberger. 38 The court in Lichtenberger found that the police exceeded the scope
of a private search when they searched an entire laptop. 39 Instead of applying
the container-based approach from Jacobsen, the court focused on the “virtual certainty” language used in Jacobsen. 40 The Lichtenberger court reasoned
that because a laptop has the capacity to hold vast amounts of information,
the threshold of “virtual certainty” to search beyond what the private searcher viewed was a high bar to meet. 41 Additionally, the court argued that the
larger storage capacity of the laptop greatly increased the privacy interests of
the defendant. 42 The Lichtenberger standard limits the government search to
just the data viewed by a private searcher, and the government cannot search
beyond that data without a warrant unless they are “virtually certain” of
what they will find. 43 This standard provides more protection for individual
privacy interests but lacks the clarity of the Runyan rule because it requires a
fact-intensive analysis into what a private searcher actually viewed. 44
The Lichtenberger standard has been both implicitly and explicitly
adopted by other federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit took a similar approach in United States v. Sparks but did not cite to Lichtenberger specifically. 45 In Sparks, the Eleventh Circuit found that the police exceeded the scope

36. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“This Court finds Runyan to be particularly on point.”).
37. Guindi, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
38. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
39. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491.
40. Id. at 488 (“Officer Huston had to proceed with ‘virtual certainty’ that the ‘inspection of the [laptop] and its contents would not tell [him] anything more than he already had
been told [by Holmes.]’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 119 (1984))).
41. See id. at 488–89 (discussing the low probability that a previously unopened file on
the laptop would contain similar images of child pornography).
42. See id. (“[T]here was a very real possibility Officer Huston . . . could have discovered
something else on Lichtenberger’s laptop that was private, legal, and unrelated to the allegations prompting the search—precisely the sort of discovery the Jacobsen Court sought to
avoid . . . .”); see also id. at 489 (“The same folders . . . could have contained, for example, explicit photos of Lichtenberger himself: legal, unrelated to the crime alleged, and the most private sort of images. Other documents, such as bank statements or personal communications,
could also have been discovered among the photographs.”).
43. See John M. Walton III, Note, Virtually Certain to Frustrate: The Application of the
Private Search Doctrine to Computers and Computer Storage Devices, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 465,
479–80 (2016).
44. See id. at 489–90.
45. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
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of a private search by viewing a video stored on a cell phone that the private
searcher had not viewed. 46 The police did not exceed the scope of the private
search, however, by viewing photos and videos that the private searcher already viewed. 47 Implicitly, the Sparks ruling endorsed the Lichtenberger
standard that only the data viewed by a private searcher can be searched by
the government unless the police have “virtual certainty” of what they will
find outside the original data viewed.
Two district courts outside of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also endorsed a standard similar to the Lichtenberger standard. Seven years before
the Sixth Circuit decided Lichtenberger, the Middle District of Pennsylvania
adopted a similar approach in United States v. Crist. 48 The Crist court held
that the police exceeded the scope of a private search when officers searched
the entire hard drive of a computer on which a private searcher had only
viewed a couple of videos. 49 The court also distinguished the Runyan rule by
stating that “[a] hard drive is not analogous to an individual disk. Rather, a
hard drive is comprised of many platters, or magnetic data storage units,
mounted together. Each platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its entirety,
is analogous to a single disk as discussed in Runyan.” 50 The Crist court reasoned that the privacy interests of the defendant would not be adequately
protected by analogizing the entire hard drive to a single container. 51 Crist
highlighted concerns over applying the Runyan rule to evolving technology—concerns that, after seven additional years of technological evolution,
would later influence the Lichtenberger analysis. In addition to implicit endorsements of the Lichtenberger standard by several courts, the District of
Puerto Rico explicitly adopted the standard in United States v. RiveraMorales. 52 Overall, the Lichtenberger standard embodies the other side of the
circuit split on how the private search doctrine applies to electronic devices.
Determining the extent to which the concept of physical containment
applies to electronic storage is the key issue animating the circuit split. To
determine the scope of a permissible reconstruction, a court must define a
“container” for electronic data. 53 This definition is not obvious. The Court in
Jacobsen struggled to define the bounds of a physical container. 54 Even
though there was a closed tube containing bags of drugs within the shipping

46. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336.
47. Id.
48. 627 F. Supp. 2d 575 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
49. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 585–86.
50. Id. at 586.
51. See id. (“While Crist’s privacy interest was lost as to the ‘couple of videos’ opened by
Hipple, it is no foregone conclusion that his privacy interest was compromised as to all the
computer’s remaining contents.”).
52. See 166 F. Supp. 3d 154, 166 (D.P.R. 2015) (describing the Lichtenberger standard as
“after-the-fact confirmation of a private search”).
53. Espeland, supra note 22, at 781.
54. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984).
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box, the Court ultimately chose to define the scope of the permissible search
by the physical boundaries of the shipping box and found that opening the
tube did not go beyond that scope. 55 A box-within-a-box scenario complicates the analysis of the scope of a search, and electronic devices increasingly
convolute this assessment. 56
Electronic devices act like Russian nesting dolls. 57 They can almost infinitely subdivide their contents into smaller and smaller groups. 58 The bigger
and more complex the device, the more complicated this boxes-within-boxes
nesting can get. For example, on any standard laptop a single picture could
be stored in the following way: “Files”–“Documents”–“Folder X”–“Folder
Y”–“Folder Z”–“Document A”–“Page 25”–“Picture.” This is only one of an
almost infinite number of possible organizational schemes, not to mention
the possibility of duplicate documents or files stored under different labels.
The question, however, remains the same as that in the Jacobsen case: At
which subdivision does an expectation of privacy become frustrated? 59
It cannot be the case that every possible item capable of holding others is
its own container. Neither the size of the shipping box nor the potential
number of smaller boxes it could hold influenced the Jacobsen Court’s determination. 60 The Court’s silence regarding these factors could imply that
they do not change the analysis. Or the silence could simply be a product of
the specific facts of the case, such that the factors could potentially change
the container analysis under different circumstances.
The circuit split in the electronic context highlights both interpretations
of the Court’s silence on the size and capacity factors. The courts in Runyan
and Rann primarily focused on clearly defining the scope of a search. 61 Tailoring the analysis based on the storage capacity of devices would only serve
to create uncertainty for police officers in the field and potentially interfere
with efficient investigations. 62 On the other hand, the courts in Lichtenberger
55. Id. at 120.
56. See Holley, supra note 20, at 682–83; Walton, supra note 43, at 487–88.
57. Holley, supra note 20, at 682–83.
58. See id. at 682.
59. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121 (“[T]he package could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was just like a balloon ‘the distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as
to its contents—particularly to the trained eye of the officer.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (plurality opinion))).
60. See id. at 118–19 (“Even if the white powder was not itself in ‘plain view’ because it
was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty
that nothing else of significance was in the package . . . .” (emphasis added)).
61. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 461–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he police
exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine a closed container that was not
opened by the private searchers unless the police are already substantially certain of what is
inside that container based on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the
private search, and their expertise.”); see also Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir.
2012) (adopting the holding of Runyan).
62. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (arguing that if the police exceeded the scope of the private search every time they encountered an item in the container that the private searcher did
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and Sparks primarily focused on limiting the types of information exposed to
a warrantless search. 63 The devices in those cases had large storage capacities,
and that fact fundamentally changed the courts’ container analysis. 64 Under
this type of analysis, clear, workable rules are considered a secondary concern because electronics are viewed as Fourth Amendment game-changers. 65
Without a clear definition of an electronic container, lower courts will continue to struggle with size and capacity factors when applying Jacobsen to
electronic private searches. The Supreme Court will need to decide whether
size and capacity factors change the Jacobsen analysis when applied to electronics and clearly define the scope of an electronic “container” in order to
resolve this circuit split.
II.

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES: CARPENTER’S DIVIDING
LINE

If the Supreme Court does resolve this circuit split, the Carpenter opinion’s heavy emphasis on the unique nature of CSLI records should greatly
influence its analysis of the private search doctrine as applied to electronic
devices. This Part explains the relationship between the private search and
third-party doctrines, analyzing how the quantity and quality of information
stored on electronic devices affects Fourth Amendment analysis. It argues
that the circuit split should be resolved based on the logic of Carpenter.
The Jacobsen Court used reasoning similar to that underlying the thirdparty doctrine when creating the private search doctrine. 66 The third-party
doctrine is based on the idea that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any information that they voluntarily disclose to a third
party. 67 The private search doctrine, by contrast, does not contain a volunnot find, the result “would over-deter the police, preventing them from engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any reasonable expectation of privacy has already been eroded”).
63. See United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (“While Widner’s
private search of the cell phone might have removed certain information from the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, it did not expose every part of the information contained in the cell
phone.”); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 489 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[Folders searched
on the laptop] could have contained, for example, explicit photos of Lichtenberger himself:
legal, unrelated to the crime alleged, and the most private sort of images. Other documents,
such as bank statements or personal communications, could also have been discovered among
the photographs. . . . The reality of modern data storage is that the possibilities are expansive.”).
64. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336 (discussing the large storage capacity of cell phones, the
range of information types cell phones are able to store, and the potentially intimate nature of
that information); Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488 (discussing the many types of data computers
are able to store in vast amounts for long periods of time).
65. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 486–87 (“[S]earches of physical spaces and the items they
contain differ in significant ways from searches of complex electronic devices under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
66. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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tariness requirement—it generally applies to situations where a person did
not give a third party permission to access their information. 68 The lack of a
voluntariness element arguably creates a greater individual privacy interest
in the private search doctrine than in the third-party doctrine. In a government search under the former, the individual did not necessarily intend to
share their information with a third party and assume the risk that the third
party would disclose that information to the police. Notably, the Court in
Carpenter, when analyzing third-party doctrine, found that CSLI is not voluntarily shared by cell phone users and gave greater protection to privacy
interests as a result. 69 At the very least, individual privacy interests under the
private search doctrine are on par with those under the third-party doctrine.
But can the logic applied in Carpenter be applied to the private search doctrine?
Carpenter focused on the uniqueness of CSLI and technological advances generally. 70 The Court emphasized “the seismic shifts in digital technology
that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.” 71 These “seismic
shifts” made CSLI a “distinct category of information” to which the Court
declined to extend the third-party doctrine. 72 Carpenter was not the first
time that the Court limited an established doctrine under the Fourth
Amendment due to the quantity and quality of information made available
through digital technology. The Court in Riley v. California found that the
high storage capacity of electronic devices and their ability to connect to the
internet made them categorically different from other physical items. 73 The
Riley Court declined to extend the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the

68. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 130 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the analogy between the third-party doctrine and the private search
doctrine “is imperfect since the risks assumed by a person whose belongings are subjected to a
private search are not comparable to those assumed by one who voluntarily chooses to reveal
his secrets to a companion”).
69. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“[A] cell phone logs a cellsite record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls,
texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when
checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from
the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive
dossier of his physical movements.” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745 (1979))).
70. See id. at 2219 (“While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at the
start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. . . .
[W]ireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 meters.”).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 2219–20.
73. 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (discussing the vast amount of information that electronics can store and how the internet can store even more information).
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warrant requirement and held that police must obtain a warrant before digitally searching electronic devices incident to arrest. 74 Taken together, Carpenter and Riley signal that digital technology is a turning point for Fourth
Amendment law.
Many scholars have argued that electronics are qualitatively different
from other physical items and should be treated differently under the Fourth
Amendment. 75 Their argument centers on the fact that “[m]odern computers are able to store vast amounts of information, equal to approximately
eighty million pages of text, with capacity doubling approximately every two
years.” 76 Not only do electronic devices have astonishingly large storage capacities, they contain an immense amount of personal information and hold
“the privacies of life.” 77 Any given smartphone might hold “a wealth of detail
about [one’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” 78 Professor Orin Kerr argues that digital searches of electronic devices
are more invasive of privacy interests than searches of the home. 79 According to Kerr, the need to create different Fourth Amendment rules for digital
technology will become self-evident as technology continues to advance. 80
The qualitative differences between digital devices and other physical
objects are further underscored by the fact that most digital devices can connect to the internet. 81 The Court in Riley expressed concern over how an internet connection could drastically change the nature of a search. 82 In Riley,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the analogy of a cell phone to a container
“crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located else-

74. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03. It should be noted that both Lichtenberger and Sparks cited the Riley decision as part of their reasoning. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015). Additionally, both Runyan and Rann were decided years before Riley, so the Riley decision could potentially alter the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ analysis in the future.
75. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531 (2005).
76. Holley, supra note 20, at 682 (footnotes omitted) (“For context, this is more information than is contained in one floor’s worth of academic journals in the average university
library.” (footnote omitted)).
77. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); Orin
S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 405
(2013) (“Much of the information stored in a person’s cellular phone is deeply personal. The
information can include photographs, text messages, e-mails, personal notes, records of visited
websites, and many other kinds of personal information.”).
78. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
79. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 569.
80. Kerr, supra note 77, at 407–08 (“Over time, advancing technology will cause the digital to seem more and more different from the physical. The need for different rules governing
digital devices eventually will seem obvious.”).
81. See Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)? Meaning & Definition, BUS.
INSIDER (May 10, 2018, 1:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-thingsdefinition [https://perma.cc/FDG4-E92W].
82. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 397.
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where, at the tap of a screen.” 83 “Cloud computing,” the ability of “Internetconnected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on
the device itself,” is a good example. 84 The rise of cloud computing has altered our understanding of what it means for information to be contained on
a device because “[c]ell phone users often may not know whether particular
information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes
little difference.” 85 These device features are why many argue that the Jacobsen standard should be limited to physical containers only. 86 In Jacobsen, the
police could not open any other box and find the exact same drugs that were
inside the shipping box. If a person can access “the cloud” from any device
that can connect to the internet, the analogy of electronics to containers
breaks down at a fundamental level.
Beyond the quantitative and qualitative factors, Carpenter’s logic regarding voluntariness can be applied to the private search circuit split as well.
Cell phones and electronic devices are pervasive in society. 87 That fact has
not gone unnoticed by the Court. 88 In Carpenter, the Court went so far as to
say that “carrying [a cell phone] is indispensable to participation in modern
society.” 89 The indispensable nature of cell phones and electronic devices in
modern society decreases the likelihood that a person is knowingly assuming
the risk that a third party will view their information. In fact, most people
carry their mobile devices on their person for nearly twenty-four hours a
day 90—effectively keeping them away from third parties. In essence, our
electronic devices have become extensions of ourselves. They follow us

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Dylan Bonfigli, Note, Get a Warrant: A Bright-Line Rule for Digital Searches
Under the Private-Search Doctrine, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 331 (2017) (“Because of the differences in privacy concerns, courts should not treat personal computers in the same way as the
cardboard box in Jacobsen and other physical containers.”); Walton, supra note 43, at 493
(“Due to the extensive privacy interests at stake, and the impracticability of applying the private search doctrine to computers—under either the physical device approach or the data or
file approach—courts should preclude the government’s use of the private search doctrine
when the ‘container’ involved is a computer.”).
87. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/G6XC-JYFZ] (stating that 95% of U.S. adults own a cell
phone, 77% own a smartphone, 73% own desktop or laptop computers, and 53% own a tablet
computer).
88. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (“According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart
phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting
that they even use their phones in the shower.”).
89. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
90. See id. at 2218 (“[T]hey compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell
phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences,
doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”).
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wherever we go and record our lives in detail. 91 The deeply personal nature
of the contents of electronic devices and their immense storage capacity
weigh heavily in favor of applying a Carpenter-like rule to the private search
doctrine, despite the fact that the doctrine does not have a voluntariness requirement. The Carpenter Court recognized that technological advancements change the Fourth Amendment balancing act due to large shifts in
privacy interests. 92 It is time for the Court to do the same with the private
search doctrine.
III. CREATING A NARROW ELECTRONIC PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
The private search doctrine must be very narrowly applied to electronic
devices. The Court should use the logic of Carpenter, in the context of the
third-party doctrine, to narrow the scope of the private search doctrine because of the close relationship between those two doctrines. The original balance of interests struck in Jacobsen must be altered to give sufficient
protection to privacy interests in this new context. This Part proposes a narrow rule in order to resolve the circuit split, addresses possible counterarguments, and provides policy justifications for the proposed rule.
The scope of a digital government search should be limited to just the
data viewed by a private searcher. This rule is based on Professor Kerr’s exposed-data approach to digital searches generally. 93 Kerr’s argument is based
on the concept of plain view: if the officer does not have a warrant to search
the computer, the scope of his search authority is limited to just that information displayed on the screen without any manipulation by the officer. 94
This supports narrowing the private search doctrine for electronic devices
because the Court in Jacobsen cited to the plain view doctrine when creating
the private search doctrine. 95 Thus, when a private party shows a government agent data related to criminal activity, the government agent is allowed
to view what is exposed on the screen, so long as what is shown is what the
private party previously saw. No other data can be viewed, and the agent

91. See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last
Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
92. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“[This case] is about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years. Such a chronicle
implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith or Miller.”).
93. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 556–57 (“The scope of a computer search should be
whatever information appears on the output device, whether that output device is a screen,
printer, or something else. Under this approach, scrolling down a word processing file to see
parts of the file that were previously hidden is a distinct search of the rest of the file.”).
94. See id. (discussing the fact that searches of any kind are generally related to human
observation and that data can be organized in many different ways).
95. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119–20 (1984) (citing Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–90 (1971)) (“The agent’s viewing of what a private party had
freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
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cannot manipulate the screen in any way in order to expose more data. In
order to search more, the agent must get a warrant. 96
This bright-line rule comes with practical downsides. Under the proposed rule, police will likely have difficulty proving exactly what was on a
screen during a private search. For instance, if a private searcher closes a file
or turns off a device after finding evidence of a crime, the police will have to
use extreme caution to reconstruct the private search. Police will have to ask
the private searcher, “Can you show me exactly what you saw?” and engage
in a factual inquiry that retraces the exact steps of the private searcher.
Scrolling, clicking, or opening files will only be allowed if the private searcher performed those same actions previously. If the private searcher cannot
remember their exact steps, the officer must stop and get a warrant to finish
searching the device. 97 The ban on independent officer manipulation thus
eliminates any discretion to widen the scope of a search.
This nonmanipulation rule is likely to impose a warrant requirement on
a large swath of previously permissible searches under the private search
doctrine. Some might even argue that the ban on independent officer manipulation will virtually eviscerate the private search doctrine because private
searchers often do not remember exactly what they opened before finding
the contraband or evidence. 98 While descriptions from a private searcher can
be used as evidence to support a warrant application, 99 establishing probable
cause could still be difficult without an officer’s firsthand observations.
These concerns are valid, but the proposed rule only requires officers to follow the same nonmanipulation principles in the digital world as they already
do in the physical world.
These principles are most clearly presented by the plain view doctrine. If
officers are legally authorized to be in a space, they are allowed to seize any
contraband or evidence in plain view. 100 But officers are not allowed to abuse
the doctrine by manipulating their surroundings in order to broaden their

96. Unless another exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigency, applies.
97. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 556–57.
98. Cf. Adam A. Bereston, Comment, The Private Search Doctrine and the Evolution of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in the Face of New Technology: A Broad or Narrow Exception?, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 472–73 (2016) (“When a private searcher cannot be certain
whether the images shown to police are among the same images viewed during the initial private search, otherwise reasonable police conduct would be held unreasonable . . . . The aforementioned factual quandary created by this demanding standard may very well signal the
death of the private search doctrine.”).
99. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.”).
100. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (“What the ‘plain view’ cases
have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused.”).
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search. 101 For example, the Supreme Court found that moving objects in order to view the serial number of a stereo was impermissibly manipulative
under the plain view doctrine. 102 And under the related plain feel doctrine,
officers cannot manipulate an item in a person’s pocket during a Terry pat
down in order to determine its contents. 103 Because the private search doctrine was created using reasoning similar to the plain view doctrine, 104 it follows that similar nonmanipulation principles should be extended to the
private search context. The proposed rule places no more restrictions on officers in the digital context than in the physical world.
Another notable downside of the proposed rule is that its screen-based
approach prevents officers from accessing metadata without a warrant.
Metadata is “data about data.” 105 It is used to “organize, manage, and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data.” 106 Metadata typically does
not appear on paper printouts of electronic files or on the screen when electronic files are opened. 107 Consequently, it is highly unlikely that a private
searcher will ever see metadata during their initial search—thus requiring an
officer to get a warrant before searching for that information. Metadata can
be some of the most useful information to law enforcement. 108 The proposed
rule will restrict police access to this useful information, but that is the cost
that the Fourth Amendment requires in order to protect twenty-first century
privacy interests. Police will still have tools available to get this coveted information: warrants and other exceptions to the warrant requirement. 109
Despite its downsides, a narrow electronic private search doctrine preserves the central logic of Jacobsen but more effectively protects twenty-first
century privacy interests by extending the logic of Carpenter. The logic of
Jacobsen is straightforward: (1) A private party does not violate the Fourth
101. See id. (“[T]he ‘plan view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”).
102. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987).
103. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993).
104. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
105. Adam K. Israel, Note, To Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of Metadata and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2009)
(“For example, metadata often reports the author’s name and initials; the name of the company
or organization where the document was created; the name of the author’s computer; the name
of the server or network on which the document was saved; the names of previous document
authors; the original text, along with any revisions to the original text; template information;
any digital comments made on the document; document versions; and hidden text.”).
106. Metadata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
107. GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: E-DISCOVERY
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 (2006); Steven C. Bennett &
Jeremy Cloud, Coping with Metadata: Ten Key Steps, 61 MERCER L. REV. 471, 471 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Apple’s Messages Metadata Could Be Valuable to Law Enforcement, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2016/
09/29/apples-messages-metadata-could-be-valuable-to-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/
82KA-BJQ9].
109. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
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Amendment by searching the property of another; 110 (2) A person loses their
expectation of privacy in information that a third party reveals to government officials; 111 (3) “Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy
occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the
now nonprivate information.” 112 The scope of what is nonprivate information during the government’s subsequent search is what has caused the
circuit split.
This is where Carpenter’s logic applies. The Carpenter Court focused on
the fact that “the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a
category of information otherwise unknowable.” 113 If the scope of the government search is allowed to be any wider than the exposed and previously
viewed data, there is a greater risk that the agent will view information unknown to the private searcher. That information might be of a completely
different character than the previously searched data, 114 and the owner’s expectation of privacy in that information might not be frustrated. The proposed rule makes Jacobsen’s “virtual certainty” standard into a bright-line
rule by clearly stating that in the digital context, police can never be “virtually certain” of what they will find outside of the exposed and previously
searched data. 115 For example, if while reconstructing a private search an officer sees an unopened file labeled “Murder Details,” the officer would not be
able to open the file under the proposed rule. The officer could not be “virtually certain” of the file’s contents based on the label alone. 116 The best way to
ensure that police do not use the window of nonprivate information conveyed by a private searcher to break into an entire warehouse of private information is to make the window as small as possible.
In order to protect the heightened privacy interests in the digital context,
this rule does not extend the Jacobsen container-based approach. Although

110. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
111. Id. at 117.
112. Id.
113. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
114. Cf. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure:
trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the
mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”).
115. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119. This bright-line rule distinguishes the proposal of this
Note from the Lichtenberger standard. The Lichtenberger standard is narrow in scope, but it
allows for officers to search beyond the data previously viewed by a private party without a
warrant if the officers are “virtually certain” of what they will find. Walton, supra note 43, at
479–80.
116. Cf. RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 51 (2007) (“Criminals can easily hide evidence
by mislabeling files. It is unlikely that a suspect will label a file ‘evidence-of-a-crime.doc’ or
some other variation that clearly indicates that the file contains pertinent evidence. Additionally, evidence of a crime can be found in almost any type of file.” (footnote omitted)).
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the container-based approach provides a clear, administrable rule for law enforcement, 117 it sacrifices significant privacy interests. There is concern that a
narrow rule will overdeter police and make officers reluctant to conduct a
search under the private search doctrine at all for fear of mistakenly finding
evidence that could later be suppressed at trial. 118 This concern is misplaced.
A narrow rule will provide the police with more guidance about what is and
is not a valid search under the private search doctrine. Giving the police wide
discretion under the container-based approach will cause numerous suppression issues because courts can question every decision officers make
during such broad searches. A narrow approach eliminates the discretionary
element of a search and will likely reduce the number of suppression issues.
Even if the narrow approach deters police from taking arguably reasonable
action, that is not necessarily a bad outcome. 119 Promoting caution before
searching through what could amount to an entire chronicle of someone’s
life restrains government overreach into individual privacy.
The narrow approach is also criticized for wasting time and resources by
forcing police to obtain warrants based on limited information. 120 But there
is no evidence that the administrative costs of obtaining warrants are astronomically large. Notably, many scholars have argued that the probable cause
standard articulated in Illinois v. Gates 121 makes obtaining a warrant easier in
the modern age. 122 Additionally, many states and the federal government
permit police to obtain a warrant by telephone—greatly reducing time and
resource costs. 123 Although it might be inconvenient for officers to obtain a
117. See Bereston, supra note 98, at 472 (arguing that police can be trusted to search an
entire electronic device under the private search doctrine because police are reasonable actors).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (arguing that a
narrow approach “would over-deter the police, preventing them from engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any reasonable expectation of privacy has already been eroded”); Bereston, supra note 98, at 470 (arguing that a narrow approach “would lead police to be
reluctant when conducting a subsequent search for fear that they will discover important evidence that will be subject to suppression simply because the private searcher did not happen to
discover that evidence during his or her initial search”).
119. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 883 (2014) (“For [Justice Frankfurter], the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment, derived from its history, was that when discretion is
afforded to law-enforcement officers to engage in search and seizure, it is all too likely to be
abused, and accordingly searches and seizures not previously authorized by a warrant should
be condemned in the absence of strict necessity.”).
120. See, e.g., Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465; Bereston, supra note 98, at 470–71.
121. 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
122. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 476–77 (1991); Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 792 (2013) (“Courts have
determined, for example, that both positive alerts from drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint
matches are sufficient on their own, without any other evidence, to satisfy probable cause [under Gates].”).
123. See Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 329 (1988); see also
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warrant, mere inconvenience cannot outweigh the heightened privacy interests in these types of cases. 124 Furthermore, many electronic private search
cases involve easily recognizable contraband. 125 In these cases, the police will
already have enough information to obtain a search warrant for the entire
device. And in truly time-sensitive cases, the police can use the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 126
The narrow approach has the additional benefit of consistent application
across all types of devices. Under the container-based approach, the scope of
a search changes drastically if the device is a laptop or a CD. 127 The proposed
rule’s focus on the exposed data on the screen ensures that the scope of a
search is sufficiently consistent across device types. Electronics are like icebergs. What is exposed on the screen at any given time is only a fraction of
what the entire device contains. Limiting police to the tip of the iceberg prevents unfettered access merely because of a device’s storage capacity.

John Michael Harlow, Note, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal Foot Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1243 n.186 (1992) (“Today, police may use a telephone to submit a
warrant. Even in overworked metropolitan judicial systems, a search warrant can be obtained
within four hours.”).
124. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The investigation of crime would
always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the
view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and property
may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.” (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6–11 (1977)).
125. This most commonly occurs in child pornography cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 480–81 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 818–
19 (9th Cir. 2013); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 2012). Many people in possession of child pornography have a “collector’s mentality.” Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen
Childhood, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/
how-much-can-restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html [https://perma.cc/JA6FNBCW]. Because of this mentality, it is very likely that a “collector” will have more than one
image of child pornography in his or her possession. See, e.g., United States v. Crist, 627 F.
Supp. 2d 575, 579 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that almost 1,600 images of child pornography were
found on the defendant’s laptop). Thus, the police will most likely have at least one image of
child pornography obtained through the private search and the knowledge that it is highly likely that there are more images on the device. This should be sufficient to obtain a search warrant for the device.
126. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (“It is well established that ‘exigent
circumstances,’ including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.”). Under the
exigent circumstances exception, police are allowed to conduct a warrantless search in order to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion)). The only additional restraint on police under this exception is that “[they do] not create the exigency by engaging or
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” King, 563 U.S. at 462.
The exception would thus allow officers to bypass the proposed rule’s warrant requirement in
truly time-sensitive circumstances not unlawfully manufactured by the officers themselves.
127. See
Timeline
of
Computer
History,
COMPUTER HIST. MUSEUM,
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/memory-storage/ [https://perma.cc/F37X-7ZQX]
(showing how the memory and storage capacity of electronic devices has changed over time
and differs among devices).

May 2019]

Carpenter’s Legacy

1505

Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the proposed rule—besides protecting privacy interests—is that it promotes more thorough government investigations. It creates the same incentives for police that exist under the
exclusionary rule: if evidence is repeatedly suppressed, investigatory behavior will adjust accordingly. 128 In the long run, this narrow rule promotes evidence gathering outside of the device itself in order to secure a warrant for
the device. Better investigation practices benefit society because they help
ensure that police action is based on facts rather than hunches and sloppy
investigations. 129 For example, a rule that encourages police to look for more
evidence can combat confirmation bias. 130 If police find evidence on an electronic device that supports their theory, they might be disinclined to fully
consider an alternative theory or alibi evidence. 131 Thus, while the proposed
rule may impose additional procedural hurdles, it does so to the benefit of
law enforcement investigations, not the cost.
Finally, a narrow electronic private search doctrine complies with the
spirit of the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Brennan described it,
“[a]lthough the self-restraint and care exhibited by the officers . . . is commendable, that alone can never be a sufficient protection for constitutional
liberties.” 132 The Fourth Amendment was not designed to make law enforcement’s job easy. It was designed as a barrier to the government’s natural
tendency to expedite the criminal justice process at the expense of individual
liberty. 133 While the government’s interest in detecting crime and convicting
criminals is strong, the Fourth Amendment requires that interest to outweigh the individual interest in privacy before it can be pursued through
searches and seizures. In the context of digital devices and the private search
doctrine, absent narrowly defined circumstances, the individual’s privacy interest should always be protected.

128. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 955 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that police officers operating under the exclusionary rule will “devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish probable cause” than they otherwise
would).
129. See, e.g., D. Kim Rossmo, Criminal Investigative Failures: Avoiding the Pitfalls, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Sept. 2006, at 1, 4 (discussing how tunnel vision and satisficing can prevent police from investigating leads and looking for more evidence after they are satisfied that
they have the right suspect).
130. See id. at 6 (“Confirmation (or verification) bias constitutes a type of selective thinking whereby individuals notice or search for evidence that confirms their theory while ignoring
or refusing to look for contradicting information.”).
131. See id.
132. Leon, 468 U.S. at 948 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 929–30 (“While the machinery of law enforcement and indeed the nature
of crime itself have changed dramatically since the Fourth Amendment became part of the Nation’s fundamental law in 1791, what the Framers understood then remains true today—that
the task of combating crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and
pressing concern that we may be lured by the temptations of expediency into forsaking our
commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy.”).
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CONCLUSION
The scope of the private search doctrine has been contested since its inception. 134 The doctrine’s application in the digital world, however, has
made the debate even more important. Under the private search doctrine, an
individual who did not consent to third-party search of his or her device is
exposed to a second government search. 135 Under the container-based approach, an entire device could then be subject to government search without
a warrant. 136 This essentially opens a person’s entire life to government inspection without any judicial review. 137 In order to prevent this enormous
intrusion into a person’s privacy, the Court should create a narrow electronic
private search doctrine. Requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant if
they wish to search an entire device is a necessary barrier to ensure that a
small privacy intrusion by a third party does not open the door for extensive
government intrusion into a digital chronicle of someone’s life.
Technological advancements will continue to challenge the way we
think about the Fourth Amendment. Digital devices have drastically changed
everyday American life. 138 Our devices are overflowing with our personal
thoughts, movements, and contacts. 139 As technology continues to evolve,
Fourth Amendment doctrines will fail to meet the needs of modern society
without significant alterations to account for ever-expanding digital worlds.
The circuit split over how the private search doctrine applies to electronic
devices is just one example of how technology challenges current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. 140 As the Carpenter decision demonstrated, just because an established doctrine can be applied in the electronic context does
not mean that it should. 141 As courts continue to confront difficult questions
of Fourth Amendment law, they must use decisions like Carpenter as their
guide to better protect privacy interests in the twenty-first century.

134. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 134 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
135. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119.
136. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
137. See supra note 77.
138. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Breakfast Can Wait. The Day’s First Stop Is Online., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/technology/10morning.html [https://
perma.cc/T4YE-Q642].
139. See Dominic Basulto, Just Say No to Digital Hoarding, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014),
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